Taiwan Today

Nobody Can Replace Pres. Chiang U.S. Democratic Senator Allen Ellender from Louisiana recently declared that President Eisenhower's administration should consider asking the people of Free China to choose "a more popular leader than President Chiang Kai-shek." By making such a statement Senator Ellender has certainly betrayed his utter ignorance of the Far Eastern situation in general and the conditions in China in par­ticular—an ignorance, indeed, which is not peculiar to the Senator from Louisiana but is shared by quite a number of people in the United States and other parts of the world. These people, of whom Senator Ellender is an example par excellence, are not necessarily all unsympathetic toward Free China's anti-Com­munist struggle, but most of them have been laboring under the illusion that President Chiang is no longer popular with the Chinese people. For this reason, some of them have been in­clined to favor the so-called "third force" movement. As a matter of fact, a "third force" is nowhere to be found. If a "third force" can be said to be in existence, it exists only in the wishful thinking of a small group of disgruntled and discredited politicians whose inordinate ambitions have made them blind to the realities of the existing situation and extremely anxious to fish in troubled waters. The reason why people like Senator Ellender have the illusion that President Chiang is no longer popular with the Chinese people lies in their erroneous belief that the President is largely, if not solely, responsible for the loss of the Chinese mainland to the Communists. Obviously such an assumption on their part has no foundation at all. The factors which led to the loss of the mainland are many, and limited space does not permit us to make a detailed analysis of them here. President Chiang has pointed out the National Government's mistakes in the past on many occasions, and has been frank and states-manlike enough to admit his share of the responsibility for what happened. Notwithstanding Senator Ellender's assertion to the contrary, the fact remains that President Chiang still is, as he has always been, the most popular leader of the Chinese people. Those on the mainland who used to be critical of the National Government now realize that, even as it was in the days before its removal to Taiwan, it was infinitely better than the present Communist regime in Peiping, under which the people are leading such a miserable existence that they feel that life in hell itself cannot be any worse. To the people of Free China and the 450,000,000 Chinese on the mainland, therefore, President Chiang's leadership is absolutely indispensable, and they are convinced that nobody can replace him as their beacon of light and hope in the face of the ruthless Communist oppression. The Unbreakable Korean Stalemate Despite the fact that more than a month has elapsed since President Eisenhower's inauguration, there is as yet no indication that the stalemated Korean war can be brought to an end in the foreseeable future. It would be unreasonable, of course, to expect the American Chief Executive to work wonders within the space of one or two months, but even at this early stage of his new administration it is already quite obvious that he is confronted with overwhelming difficulties in trying to break the Korean stalemate. To begin with, President Eisenhower's openly declared objec­tive of wresting the initiative from the Communists and keeping the enemy guessing has been rendered almost impossible of attainment by the vociferous demand in many quarters that whatever steps he may take in the Far East be made known to them before hand. Even the so-called "deneutralization" of Taiwan, which means no more than that the American navy has ceased to shield the Chinese Communists from attacks by Free China's armed forces, has resulted in severe criticisms by the United States' chicken-hearted allies, especially Great Britain. The possibility of taking other positive measures such as a naval blockade of the Communist-held Chinese main­land and the bombing of the Communist bases in Manchuria is causing even greater alarm in those countries which profess to be anti-Communist but will not support any drastic, effective steps against the Communists except when their own vital interests are threatened. What is dreaded by these allies of the United States is "expansion of the Korean war." To them an indefinite prolongation of the Korean stalemate is nothing undesirable so long as the United States is bearing the brunt of the fighting and sustaining ninety per cent of the casualties. Soviet Russia and the Chinese and North Korean Communists have no need to do any "guessing" and the initiative will always rest in their hand since the democratic nations participating in the UN police action in Korea keep on telling the enemy what they will or will not do. The UN forces are not winning and have no hope to win the Korean war because they are not permitted to use the best available weapons and make the most effective strategic moves. The root cause of this anomalous situation is to be found in the fact that the aforesaid chicken-hearted allies of the United States are quite afraid of Soviet Russia's military might. Hence they are warning the American Government everyday that an expansion of the Korean war will lead to the outbreak of a general conflict. The truth of the matter, however, is that the only way to prevent a third world war is to convince the Communists through both words and actions that the democracies are not afraid of a general war. Unless the anti-Communist nations stop fearing Soviet Russia, the latter will be able to make the Korean stalemate drag on as long as she pleases. Great Britain's Selfish Policy The selfishness of Great Britain's foreign policy has again been amply demonstrated by her attitude toward the latest developments in the Far Eastern situation. No sooner had President Eisenhower announced his decision to order the U. S. Seventh Fleet to cease protecting the Communist-held Chinese main­land from attacks by Free China's armed forces than a tremendous hue and cry was raised in British official circles against the first step taken by the new American Government to cope with Communist aggression. British protests became even louder when reports reached London that the United States might decide upon a naval blockade of the Chinese coast and air attacks on the Communist bases in Manchuria. In point of fact, such anti-Communist measures as a naval blockade are merely being taken into consideration by the American Government, and it is still uncertain whether anything of this kind will ultimately be carried out. What surprises us is not that Great Britain is opposed to the American Government's stiffening policy toward the Communists but the manner in which this opposition manifests itself. In view of the arrogance and peremptoriness with which British politicians have voiced their criticisms of American actions and intentions, we really cannot help wondering whether the foreign policy of the United States is being formulated in London or Washington, and we have no doubt that the same question has also arisen in the minds of many Americans. Apparently the British politicians (and also certain sections of the British public) have forgotten the fact that Great Britain today is no longer the power she was in the days be­ fore World War I. If she is not in a position to impose her will upon Iran and Egypt, much less can she hope to do so in dealing with the United States, a country which within three decades twice saved the British Isles from German conquest. British policy toward the Communists, whether of the Reunion or Chinese brand, is entirely one of appeasement. What a pity that Neville Chamberlain's umbrella, which was considered symbolic of the Munich deal and was later passed on to Clement Attlee, is again being used by Winston Church-ill! As we have pointed out in these columns before, Great Britain's policy of appeasement toward the Communists is solely actuated by her desire for commercial gains. Indeed, this desire for a few sordid dollars can easily ex­plain London's undignified efforts to please the Soviet-backed puppet regime under Mao Tse-tung: its hasty recognition of Mao's "government" in 1950; its refusal to recall the British charge d'affaires in Peiping despite the Chinese Communists' refusal to send a diplo­matic representative to Britain; and its insist­ence upon trading with the Chinese mainland though Mao's "volunteers" are continuing to kill British soldiers in Korea. In the pursuance of her selfish policy Great Britain has not hesitated to sacrifice her honor at the altar of profit.